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AFTER-SCHOOL USE OF PUBLIC
ELEMENTARY AND JUNIOR HIGH
SCHOOL FACILITIES BY STUDENT
RELIGIOUS GROUPS
The public school is at once the symbol of our democracy and the
most pervasive means for promoting our common destiny. In no
activity of the State is it more vital to keep out divisive forces than
in its schools to avoid confusing, not to say fusing, what the
Constitution sought to keep strictly apart.'
The purpose of the Good News Club is to develop a positive peer
group among students so that if/when the drug and other tough
dilemmas come just around the corner, it will be easier for kids to
stand together for what is right with a common foundation of
Biblical principles and a ?ersonal relationship with God, rather
than trying to stand alone.
This Recent Development explores the ability of public elementary
and junior high schools to remain religion-neutral after school hours.
Part I explores the dilemma public schools3 face in confronting the
1. McCollum v. Board of Educ., 333 U.S. 203, 231 (1948) (Frankfurter, J.,
concurring).
2. September 1991 promotional for Good News/Good Sports Club Kick-Off for
academic year 1991-1992 at Ladue Junior High School, Ladue, Missouri.
3. This Recent Development focuses on public elementary and junior high schools and
examines the proper relationship between religious and secular activities in public facilities.
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inherent tension between the Establishment and Free Speech clauses of
the First Amendment. Part 11 explains the constitutional principles
governing public schools' control over use of their facilities for religious
speech and related activities. Part m then focuses on the Eighth
Circuit's recent rejection of a school district's use-of-premises policy as
a violation of the First Amendment in Good News/Good Sports Club v.
School District of Ladue.5 Part IV concludes with a discussion of that
decision's impact on the educational mission of public schools.
I. INTRODUCTION
Few issues cause more debate than the place of religion in the
public schools. The public school system inculcates students with
societal values and norms that school officials believe will transform
children into responsible and productive citizens." Recognizing the
dangers of school-endorsed religion, the Supreme Court has interpreted
the Establishment Clause as prohibiting organized prayer and other forms
of religious activity involving school personnel during school hours.
It also provides a brief review of the Equal Access Act as it applies to senior high schools.
See infra notes 80-87 and accompanying text. For a more thorough discussion of the
Equal Access Act, see Michael D. Rouse, Comment, The Equal Access Controversy: A
Battle for Freedom of Religious Speech in Public Secondary Schools, 17 FLA. ST. U. L.
REV. 369 (1990).
4. This Recent Development examines the duty of public secondary schools to exclude
religious groups from school facilities to avoid endorsing - or appearing to endorse -
a particular religious group or set of beliefs. It also proposes a framework for determining
when students' rights to associate for worship and religious discussion prevail over the
school's interest in avoiding a violation of the Establishment Clause.
The constraints placed on public schools by the Free Exercise Clause are beyond the
purview of this Recent Development. For a discussion of the relationship between the
Free Exercise and Establishment Clauses, see Stanley Ingber, Religion or Ideology: A
Needed Clarification of the Religion Clauses, 41 STAN. L. REv. 233 (1989).
5. 28 F.3d 1501 (8th Cir. 1994).
6. See, e.g., Bethel School Dist. v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675 (1986). In Bethel, Chief
Justice Burger stated that "[t]he process of educating our youth for citizenship in public
schools is not confined to books, the curriculum, and the civics class; schools must teach
by example the shared values of a civilized order." Id. at 683. See generally Richard L.
Roe, Valuing Student Speech: The Work of the Schools as Conceptual Development, 79
CAL. L. REV. 1271 (1991) (discussing the competing views of the educational mission of
public schools).
7. See Edwards v. Aguillard, 482 U.S. 578 (1987) (striking down a statute forbidding
teaching of evolution theory unless creationism was also taught); Wallace v. Jaffree, 472
U.S. 38 (1985) (invalidating a statute requiring a moment of silence at the start of the
school day); Stone v. Graham, 449 U.S. 39 (1980) (prohibiting posting of the Ten
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_urbanlaw/vol48/iss1/10
SCHOOL USE BY STUDENT RELIGIOUS GROUPS
While most religious activities may not take place during school
hours, the Court has interpreted the Free Speech Clause as requiring
public schools to allow religious groups to meet on school property after
school hours if the school facilities are open to other similar groups.'
Recognizing its secular, educational mission, however, a public school
might choose to remain completely neutral to religion, yet allow a few
nonreligious groups to use school facilities. The Eighth Circuit's
decision in Good News/Good Sports Club v. School District of Ladue9
severely curtails a public school's ability to provide such a religion
neutral forum after school hours.'
II. PRINCIPLES GOVERNING THE EXCLUSION OF RELIGIOUS SPEECH
FROM PUBLIC SCHOOLS
The Establishment Clause of the First Amendment states "Congress
shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion.. ."" This
Commandments in a classroom); School Dist. of Abbington Township v. Schempp, 374
U.S. 203 (1963) (prohibiting Bible reading in the public schools); Engel v. Vitale, 370
U.S. 421 (1962) (invalidating practice of reciting prayer at the beginning of the school
day); McCollum v. Board of Educ., 333 U.S. 203 (1948) (denying use of public
classrooms for religious instruction during school hours); cf Zorach v. Clausen, 343 U.S.
306 (1952) (approving the practice of releasing students for religious instruction off
campus).
8. Students might also challenge denial of access to public school facilities for worship
or religious discussions under the Free Exercise Clause. For a comparison of free speech
to free exercise claims, see John D. Thompson, Note, Student Religious Groups and the
Right of Access to Public School Activity Periods, 74 GEO. L.L 205 (1985).
9. 28 F.3d 1501 (8th Cir. 1994).
10. In this Recent Development, the term "religion neutral" denotes a forum
completely free of symbols, imagery, or ideas of any religious, or antireligious, creed or
sect. Presumably, in such a forum, the government neither encourages nor discourages
students' religious beliefs. But see Michael D. Baker, Comment, Protecting Religious
Speakers Access to Public School Facilities: Lamb's Chapel v. Center Moriches School
District, 44 CASE W. Ras. L. REv. 315 (1993) (suggesting that a religion-free forum
demonstrates antireligious bigotry).
11. The First Amendment states:
Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting
the free exercise thereof; or abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press; or the
right of the people peaceably to assemble, and to petition the Government for a
redress of grievances.
U.S. CoNsT. amend. L The First Amendment applies to the states through the Fourteenth
Amendment. School Dist. of Abbington Township, 374 U.S. at 253-58 (Brennan, J.,
concurring).
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constitutional mandate means that the State cannot endorse, or appear to
endorse, religion or a particular religious viewpoint.' Thus, the
Establishment Clause prohibits both favoritism and hostility toward
religion.
13
The First Amendment also states that "Congress shall make no law
... abridging the freedom of speech.. ."" Known as the Free Speech
Clause, this clause protects the free exchange of ideas, promotes
intelligent self-government, and provides "the freedom to think as you
will and to speak as you think."' 5 In the public school context, the Free
Speech Clause protects students' right to associate for the purpose of
engaging in religious worship and discussion.'
6
A. The First Amendment in the Public School Setting
When applying both the Establishment and Free Speech Clause
mandates of the First Amendment to public schools, most courts are
mindful of the public school system's role in society. 7 Public schools
are charged with inculcating democratic ideals into the nation's youth.
Attendance is mandatory, making school children a captive audience."
12. In Everson v. Board of Educ., the Supreme Court explained the Establishment
Clause as follows:
Neither a state nor the Federal Government can set up a church. Neither can pass
laws which aid one religion, aid all religions, or prefer one religion over another.
Neither can force nor influence a person to go to or to remain away from church
against his will or force him to profess a belief or disbelief in any religion .... In
the words of Jefferson, the clause against establishment of religion by law was
intended to erect "a wall of separation between Church and State."
330 U.S. 1, 15-16 (1947).
13. See Nadine Strossen, A FrameworkforEvaluatingEqualAccess Claims by Student
Religious Groups: Is There a Window for Free Speech in the Wall Separating Church and
State?, 71 CORNELL L. Ry. 143, 143 n.6 (1985).
14. U.S. CONST. amend. I; see supra note 11 for the full text of the First Amendment.
15. LAuRENCE H. TRIBE, AMmCAN CoNsTrrroNAL LAW, § 8-5, at 576-78, § 8-6,
at 578-79 (2d ed. 1988).
16. See Rouse, supra note 3, at 392-96.
17. See Epperson v. Anderson, 393 U.S. 97, 104-05 (1968) (stating that courts should
not needlessly intervene in public education, which is traditionally committed to the control
of state and local authorities).
18. In addition to compulsory attendance laws, a student is a captive audience in that
he or she has no effective control over what he or she studies. Unlike in a university, a
primary or secondary school student's course of study is limited to the curriculum and
activities sanctioned by school administrators. See, e.g., Board of Educ. v. Pico, 457 U.S.
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_urbanlaw/vol48/iss1/10
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Students, especially younger students, emulate teachers and look to them
as role models. In addition, students are susceptible to peer pressure.19
Incorporating religion or prayer into curricular, and in some cases
noncurricular, activities creates a potential for divisiveness and exclusion
of those students who adhere to no religious beliefs.2'
The Supreme Court has repeatedly recognized that public school
students' First Amendment rights are not necessarily as extensive as
adults' rights.2 In Hazelwood School District v. Kuhlmeier,z2 the
Court emphasized that schools must be able to remain neutral on
controversial issues in order to fulfill their role as "a principal instrument
in awakening the child to cultural values, in preparing him for later
professional training, and in helping him to adjust normally to his
environment." The necessity of public schools remaining neutral
constrains the students' First Amendment right of expression.
B. The Public Forum Doctrine and Viewpoint Discrimination
To evaluate restrictions on expression, including those curtailing
student religious expression, the Supreme Court applies the public forum
853, 914 (1982) (Renquist, J., dissenting).
19. Some courts question whether participating in religious activities is truly voluntary
in the school setting, given children's tendency to succumb to peer pressure. See Wallace
v. Jeffree, 472 U.S. 38, 72 (1985) (O'Connor, J., concurring) (noting children's propensity
fbr imitation and distaste for nonconformity); Lubbock Civil Liberties Union v. Lubbock
Indep. School Dist., 669 F.2d 1038 (5th Cir. 1982).
20. See Bender v. Williamsport Area School Dist., 741 F.2d 538, 553-54 (3rd Cir.
1984).
21. Hazelwood School Dist. v. Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 260, 266 (1987) (citing Bethel
School Dist. No. 403 v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675, 682 (1986)).
22. 484 U.S. 260 (1994). Hazelwood involved students' claims that school officials
violated their First Amendment rights by deleting two pages from the student newspaper
which included articles on teenage pregnancy and divorce. Id. at 262. The Court found
the principal's decision to delete the pages reasonable and therefore consistent with the
First Amendment. Id. at 276.
23. Id. at 272. (quoting Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 493 (1954)). The
Court noted that educators need greater control over student activities that bear the
imprimatur of the school such as school-sponsored publications or productions. Id. at 271.
The Court differentiated student speech that the First Amendment affirmatively requires
schools to promote and student speech that the First Amendment requires schools to
tolerate. Id. at 270-71. Parents and students have greater reason to believe that the school
endorses views espoused during student activities promoted by the school.
1995]
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doctrine24 as set out in Perry Education Ass'n v. Perry Local
Educators' Ass&'n.z Under the public forum doctrine, the extent to
which the government can limit access to public property depends on the
character of the property.26 Property that "by long tradition or by
government fiat [has] been devoted to assembly and debate,"2 such as
a sidewalk, park, or street, is considered a traditional public forum.2"
In a public forum, the government cannot impose a content-based
exclusion unless the restriction is necessary to achieve a compelling state
interest and is narrowly tailored to achieve that interest.29 Public
schools are rarely considered public forums.3"
Property that is neither by tradition nor by designation a forum for
public communication is a "nonpublic forum."31 In a nonpublic forum,
the government may exclude certain subjects and groups if the
restrictions are reasonable and are viewpoint neutral.32 Under this more
24. For a history of the public forum doctrine, see Rosemary C. Salomone, Public
Forum Doctrine and the Perils of Categorical Thinking: Lessons from Lamb's Chapel, 24
N.M. L. REV. 1 (1994).
25. 460 U.S. 37 (1983). In Perry, the Court found that a school mailbox and delivery
system was not open to the public. Id. at 47. Organizations could use the mailboxes to
communicate with teachers by permission only, which was not granted as matter of course.
Id. The Court concluded that such selective access was inconsistent with a public forum.
Id.
26. Perry Educ. Ass'n, 460 U.S. at 44; Cornelius v. NAACP Legal Defense and Educ.
Fund, Inc., 473 U.S. 788, 797 (1985). The Cornelius Court described public forum
analysis as balancing the Government's interest in limiting the use of its property against
the speaker's interest in using the property for another purpose. Cornelius, 473 U.S. at 800.
The Court factors in the type of property, its intended use, and the disruption likely to be
caused by the speaker. Id. See Salomone, supra note 24, at 13 (noting a shift in the
public forum doctrine from a concept protecting the rights of individual speech to rigid
rules protecting government discretion).
27. Perry Educ. Ass'n, 460 U.S. at 45.
28. The court described traditional public fora as places which "have immemorially
been held in trust for the use of the public and, time out of mind, have been used for
purposes of assembly, communicating thoughts between citizens, and discussing public
questions." Id. at 45 (quoting Hague v. CIO, 307 U.S. 496, 515 (1939)).
29. Perry Educ. Ass'n, 460 U.S. at 45.
30. The Supreme Court has indicated that it might consider a school to be a public
forum when its property is heavily used by a wide variety of organizations. Lamb's
Chapel v. Center Moriches Union Free School Dist., 113 S. Ct. 2141, 2146-47 (1993).
31. Perry Educ. Ass'n., 460 U.S. at 46, 49.
32. Cornelius v. NAACP Legal Defense & Educ. Fund, Inc., 473 U.S. 788, 806 (1985)
(citing Perry Educ. Ass'n., 460 U.S. at 49).
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deferential review, the Court considers reasonableness33 in light of the
forum's purpose and the surrounding circumstances.34 Even if a
restriction is reasonable, a regulation that discriminates on the basis of
viewpoint violates the First Amendment.3"
Property that the State intentionally designates as a public forum,
such as a school or municipal theater, in some cases,36 is a "limited
public forum."37 The State may limit the purposes for which the forum
may be used38 and may close the forum when it chooses.39 While the
forum remains open, however, the government is subject to the standard
that applies in the traditional public forum: a restrictive regulation must
be necessary and narrowly tailored to the compelling state interest.'0
The property, however, remains a nonpublic forum for all unspecified
uses.4 As in a nonpublic forum, the exclusion of uses must only be
reasonable and viewpoint neutral.42
Because courts generally find schools to be either limited public
33. The government's restrictions need not be the most reasonable or the only
reasonable limitations. Id. at 808.
34. Id. at 809. In Cornelius, the Court concluded that a charity drive conducted in the
federal workplace was a nonpublic forum. Id. at 804-06. The Court found the
Government's practice and policy in running the charity drive inconsistent with a desire
to create a public forum for the use of all charitable organizations. Id. at 805.
Specifically, government officials limited participation to groups that met certain criteria,
which represented only a fraction of all charitable organizations. Id.
35. Id. at 811 (citations omitted).
36. See Brian S. Black, Note, The Public School: Beyond the Fringes of Public
Forum Analysis?, 36 VILL. L. REV. 831, 840 (1991).
37. Cornelius v. NAACP Legal Defense & Educ. Fund, Inc., 473 U.S. 788, 800
(1985). To determine if public officials intentionally created a public forum, the Court
examines both policy and practice. Perry Educ. Ass'n, 460 U.S. at 47.
38. Perry Educ. Ass'n, 460 U.S. at 46 n.7. Such limited purposes include use by
certain groups and discussion of certain subjects. Id.
39. Id. at 46.
40. Id. (citing Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U.S. 263, 269-70 (1981)); see supra notes 24-
30 and accompanying text (discussing restrictions on public forums).
41. Id. at 48.
42. Perry Educ. Ass'n, 460 U.S. at 46; see supra notes 31-35 and accompanying text
(discussing restrictions on nonpublic forums).
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forums or nonpublic forums,43 viewpoint discrimination takes central
importance in analyzing a school's use-of-premises policy. 4
Impermissible viewpoint discrimination occurs when public officials
exclude speakers in order to suppress their views on subjects otherwise
open to discussion in the forum.45 Thus, to avoid abridging free
speech, a school's use-of-premises policy must allow speakers with
religious viewpoints to address any subject matter that speakers with
nonreligious viewpoints would be allowed to address.46 This analysis
is fact-intensive and the ultimate result may turn on the court's
characterization of the subject matter being addressed. 7
43. Schools may be public forums only if school authorities have, by practice or
policy, opened the forum for indiscriminate use by the general public or student groups
or both. Hazelwood School Dist. v. Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 260, 267 (1988).
44. In both limited public forums and nonpublic forums, an exclusion of religious uses
must be reasonable and viewpoint neutral. See infra text accompanying note 46.
45. Cornelius v. NAACP Legal Defense and Educ. Fund, Inc., 478 U.S. 788, 806
(1985).
46. Some commentators question whether the viewpoint neutrality requirement should
apply to public schools that necessarily must select certain views and exclude others in
setting a curriculum that reflects societal values. See Salomone, supra note 24, at 16.
47. In Good News/Good Sports Club v. School Dist. of Ladue, the Eighth Circuit
expansively defined the subject matter of the sole included speaker, the Boy Scouts, as
"moral character and youth development." 28 F.3d 1501, 1506 (8th Cir. 1994).
Consequently, the court found that the school district discriminated on the basis of
viewpoint for excluding the Good News Club, which sought to address the same issue
from a religious perspective. Id.
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_urbanlaw/vol48/iss1/10
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C. The Establishment Clause Defense
Once a court determines that a school district has impermissibly
excluded speakers from the limited public forum or nonpublic forum, the
district may attempt to justify its restrictions by arguing that a compelling
state interest exists for the exclusion. Interests offered by school districts
include preventing public unrest" and avoiding an Establishment Clause
violation.
The Supreme Court has recognized that adherence to the
Establishment Clause's mandate of separation of church and state might
be a compelling interest justifying an abridgement of speech that
otherwise would violate the First Amendment.49 Traditionally, the
Court has examined such claims under the heavily-criticized test50
announced in Lemon v. Kurtzman.5' Under the Lemon test, a
government action does not violate the Establishment Clause and is not
an impermissible endorsement of religion when it (1) has a secular
48. In Cornelius, the Court explained that "government need not wait until havoc is
wreaked" to prohibit disruptive conduct. 473 U.S. at 810. More recently, in Lamb's
Chapel, the Court found no evidence that allowing the church to use school facilities
would lead to public unrest and rejected this argument as a compelling justification for
excluding religious groups from school facilities. Lamb's Chapel v. Center Moriches
Union Free School Dist., 113 S. CL 2141, 2148 (1993).
49. Lamb's Chapel, 113 S. Ct. at 2148.
50. Both commentators and Justices alike have expressed dissatisfaction with the
Lemon test. Recent Supreme Court decisions mark increasing dissatisfaction with the
Lemon test and suggest that the Court may soon endorse a more flexible test. In Lee v.
Wei man, 112 S. CL 2649 (1992), the Court avoided the use of the Lemon test but did not
overrule the decision. In Lamb's Chapel, the Court relegated the Lemon test to the final
two sentences of its terse Establishment Clause analysis. 113 S. Ct. at 2148. Justice
Scalia, concurring in the judgment, responded with a plea to end the intermittent use of
the Lemon test:
Like some ghoul in a late-night horror movie that repeatedly sits up in its grave and
shuffles abroad, after being repeatedly killed and buried, Lemon stalks our
Establishment Clause jurisprudence once again ....
Over the years... no fewer than five of the currently sitting Justices have, in their
own opinions, personally driven pencils through the creature's heart... and a sixth
has joined an opinion doing so.
Id. at 2149-50 (Scalia, J., concurring). In Footnote 7 to the opinion of the Court, however,
Justice White both reaffirmed the Lemon test and suggested that it might soon be put to
rest: "While we are somewhat diverted by Justice Scalia's evening at the cinema,... we
return to the reality that there is a proper way to inter an established decision and Lemon,
however frightening it might be to some, has not been overruled." Id. at 2148 n.7.
51. 403 U.S. 602 (1971).
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purpose, 2 (2) does not have the primary effect of advancing or
inhibiting religion,53 and (3) does not foster an excessive entanglement
with religion.'
Applying the Lemon test, courts have found that the policies of
public universities or secondary schools that provide for equal access by
all groups do not violate the Establishment Clause.55 However, several
decisions have held that these policies violate the primary effect prong
if they contain certain factors held to amount to viewpoint
discrimination.56 Factors that indicate official support by the school57
52. The secular purpose prong ensures that the government is not motivated by
religious considerations. Bender v. Williamsport Area School Dist., 741 F.2d 538, 551
(3rd Cir. 1984). Acceptable secular purposes include providing an open forum for the free
exchange of ideas, Widmnar v. Vincent, 454 U.S. 263, 271 (1981), and encouraging
extracurricular activities, Brandon v. Board of Educ., 635 F.2d 971, 978 (2d Cir. 1980).
Purposes may still be considered secular even when some of the ideas that are
exchanged, or several of the extracurricular groups that meet, are religious. But see
Lubbock Civil Liberties Union v. Lubbock Indep. School Dist., 669 F.2d 1038 (5th Cir.
1982). In Lubbock, the court found an impermissible secular purpose because the district
policy authorized students to meet after school hours for religious purposes. Id. at 1045.
However, the Lubbock holding can be limited by the court's stress on two particular
factors: (1) the impressionability of secondary and primary age school children; and (2)
the implicit approval by school officials, as evidenced by the religious meetings being held
at the end of the school day. Id.
53. See infra notes 56-59 and accompanying text for a discussion of the primary effect
prong of the Lemon test.
54. The Supreme Court has noted that denying equal access to religious groups creates
entanglement problems in that the school is required to monitor meetings to prevent
religious speech. Widmar v. Vincent 454 U.S. 263, 272 n.11 (1981). Moreover, the
Court has held that custodial oversight to ensure good behavior does not create an
excessive entanglement. Board of Educ. of Westside Community Schools v. Mergens, 496
U.S. 226, 252-53 (1990).
55. Widmar, 454 U.S. 263 (university); Mergens, 496 U.S. 226 (secondary schools);
Lamb's Chapel v. Center Moriches Union Free School Dist., 113 S. Ct. 2141 (1993)
(nonstudent religious group at a secondary school).
56. See infra part II.D.
57. In Widmar, the Court noted that, unlike university students, younger students might
not perceive a difference between the state merely accommodating diverse viewpoints and
the state affirmatively endorsing the views of groups using its facilities. 454 U.S. at 274
n.14. In Mergens, the Court backed away from this position in upholding Congress's
determination that secondary school students are likely to appreciate the distinction. 496
U.S. at 250.
Courts disagree on the age at which children can perceive the difference between
accommodation and endorsement. Most lower courts have found that even high school
students cannot appreciate the subtle distinction between accommodation and endorsement.
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_urbanlaw/vol48/iss1/10
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include the proximity between instructional hours and the religious
meeting58 and the involvement of school officials.5 9
In contrast, involvement of a religious group composed of members
of the community at large, as opposed to students, 60 or a district policy
that permits a broad spectrum of activities to be conducted
extracurricularly in school facilities,61 militates against a finding that the
school endorses religious activities occurring in its facilities. When such
factors are present, a court is less likely to find a violation of the
Establishment Clause based on viewpoint discrimination.
D. Supreme Court Analysis of Public Schools' Denial of
Access to Religious Groups
In Widmar v. Vincent,' the Supreme Court held that a state
university providing an open forum for student activities cannot close the
Bender v. Williamsport Area School Dist., 741 F.2d 538, 552 (3rd Cir. 1984) (noting that
high school students are less able to appreciate that permission for religious groups to meet
resulted from neutrality toward religion and not accommodation); Lubbock Civil Liberties
Union v. Lubbock Indep. School Dist., 669 F.2d 1038, 1045 (5th Cir. 1982) (noting
impressionability of children in secondary and primary schools as factor in finding a
primary effect of encouraging religion).
58. Garnett v. Renton School Dist. 874 F.2d 608, 612 (9th Cir. 1989) (finding prayer
meetings before school too closely associated with the highly structured school day);
Lubbock Civil Liberties Union, 669 F.2d at 1045 (stating that allowing religious meetings
in close proximity to the beginning or end of the school day carries the message of
implicit approval); Brandon v. Board of Educ., 635 F.2d 971, 978-79 (2nd Cir. 1980)
(commenting that the appearance of official support diminishes when religious
organizations use the school building at night).
Even when religious meetings take place before or after school hours, students remain
a captive audience and under control of the school from the moment they board the bus
until the moment they disembark in the afternoon. Bell v. Little Axe Indep. School Dist.,
766 F.2d 1391, 1406 (10th Cir. 1985).
59. The mere presence of a school official or even a parent at an activity, whether
participating or not, necessarily lends the impression that the school endorses the activity.
Bender, 741 F.2d at 552.
60. In Lamb's Chapel, for instance, the Court found no danger that the community
would associate the school with a religious meeting not sponsored by the school and
attended by church members and the general public. 113 S. Ct. at 2148.
61. Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U.S. 263, 274-75 (1981). In Mergens, the Court
somewhat limited its holding that the equal access policy did not advance religion when
it explicitly noted the absence of evidence that religious groups would dominate the forum.
496 U.S. at 252.
62. 454 U.S. 263 (1981).
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forum to students who want to use university facilities for religious
worship or teaching.' The University of Missouri at Kansas City
routinely allowed over 100 registered student organizations to use its
facilities for meetings.' The University denied access to a registered
religious group' based on a regulation prohibiting the use of university
buildings or grounds for religious worship or teaching.'
The Court found that the University had created a public forum
through its policy of generally accommodating student meetings.67 The
University argued that the regulation excluding groups based on the
religious content of their speech was necessary to serve the compelling
state interest of avoiding an Establishment Clause violation.6" The
Court applied the Lemon test and rejected the University's argument,
holding that the free access policy did not violate the Establishment
Clause.69
After briefly noting that two prongs of the Lemon test were easily
satisfied,7" the Court examined whether the policy had the primary
effect of advancing religion.7 The Court found that an equal access
policy would not have the primary effect of advancing religion and that
any benefits to religious groups would be only incidental. 2 First, the
Court found that an open forum at a university does not create an
63. Id. at 273.
64. Id. at 265.
65. The organization, "Cornerstone," was a nondenominational Christian group that
met to pray, sing hymns, study the Bible, and discuss religious views and experiences. Id.
at 265 n.2.
66. Id. at 265. The regulation provided: "No University buildings or grounds (except
chapels as herein provided) may be used for purposes of religious worship or religious
teaching by either student or nonstudent groups ....
Id. at 265 n.3.
67. Widmar, 454 U.S. at 267.
68. Id. at 270-71.
69. Id. at 271.
70. The equal access policy had the secular purpose of providing a forum for the free
exchange of ideas. Id. at 271-72 n.10. Further, not only did the Court fail to find
excessive entanglement, it also commented that greater entanglement with religion would
arise from efforts to police the no-religion proviso. Id. at 272 n.1l.
71. Id. at 272-75. The Court emphasized that the proper inquiry was whether a forum
open to all groups - including religious ones - had the effect of advancing religion. Id.
at 273.
72. Id. at 273.
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"imprimatur of state approval,"7'3 because university students are
mature enough to appreciate that the University remains neutral to
religion although religious groups may use its facilities. Second, the
Court noted that in this case the university forum was available to both
nonreligious and religious groups.74 This equality of access decreased
the likelihood that students would infer university support of religion.75
Moreover, by providing facilities, the University merely extended general
benefits to religious groups.76 The Court, however, indicated that it
might reach a different result if the religious groups dominated the
university's open forum."
In Board of Education of the Westside Community Schools v.
Mergens,7 8 the Supreme Court applied the principles of Widmar to
public secondary schools." The Court held that the senior high school
violated the Equal Access Act" when it refused a student Christian club
access to school premises on the same terms as other noncurricular
groups."' After concluding that the Equal Access Act prohibited the
school's exclusion of the student religious group, the Court rejected the
73. Id. at 274. The Court suggested a possible distinction between college students,
who are young adults, and younger students, who are more impressionable and less likely
to appreciate a policy's neutrality toward religion. Id. at 274 n.14.
74. Id. at 274.
75. Id. at 274 n.14.
76. Id. at 274. The Court compared the University's extension of the use of public
school buildings to religious groups to the provision of fire and police service to churches.
Id. at 274-75.
77. Id. at 275.
78. 496 U.S. 226 (1990). For an in-depth analysis of the Mergens decision, see Leah
Gallant Morgenstein, Note, Board of Education of Westside Community Schools v.
Mergens: Three "R's" + Religion = Mergens, 41 AM. U. L. REV. 221 (1991).
79. Mergens, 496 U.S. at 235. The Christian club wished to meet to read and discuss
the Bible, to have fellowship, and to pray together. Id. at 232.
80. The Equal Access Act provides, in relevant part:
It shall be unlawful for any public secondary school which receives Federal financial
assistance and which has a limited open forum to deny equal access or a fair
opportunity to, or discriminate against, any students who wish to conduct a meeting
within that limited open forum on the basis of the religious, political, philosophical,
or other content of the speech at such meetings.
20 U.S.C. § 4071(a) (1988).
The Court noted that, in passing the Equal Access Act, Congress intended to extend
Widmar's reasoning to secondary schools. Mergens, 496 U.S. at 235.
81. Mergens 496 U.S. at 246-47.
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school's alternative claim that the Act violated the Establishment
Clause.'
As in Widmar, the Court found that the Equal Access Act satisfied
the secular purpose and entanglement prongs of the Lemon test. 3
Applying a more detailed analysis to the primary effect prong, the Court
held that the Act did not have the primary purpose of advancing
religion.'M The Court reasoned that secondary school students are likely
to understand that because a school provides access to religious groups
on the same terms as nonreligious groups, it does not indicate that the
school endorses or supports religion."5 The Court emphasized that the
Act expressly limits participation in religious groups by school officials,
thereby decreasing the chance that students would perceive that the
school endorses religion."5 Finally, the Court noted that the broad
spectrum of clubs at the high school decreased the likelihood that
students would associate the school with the religious club."
In Lamb's Chapel v. Center Moriches Union Free School
District,8 the Supreme Court struck down a New York school district
regulation that prohibited the use of school property for after-school
activities by a religious group.89 Lamb's Chapel, a community church,
sought access to school facilities to show a film series on childrearing
and family values from a religious perspective.' School district
82. Id. at 247-53.
83. Congress' declared secular purpose was the prevention of discrimination against
religious and other types of speech. Mergens, 496 U.S. at 249. Additionally, the Court
noted that oversight by school employees for custodial purposes did not impermissibly
entangle the government in the administration of religious activities. Id. at 253. In fact,
the Court cautioned that greater entanglement problems could arise "in the form of
invasive monitoring to prevent religious speech at meetings at which such speech might
occur." Id.
84. Id. at 249-52.
85. Id. at 250.
86. Id. at 251. Moreover, the Court emphasized that the school can control the
students' perception by making clear to them that the school's official recognition of the
Christian club is not an endorsement of the group's ideas or activities. Id.
87. Id. at 252. Another factor mentioned by the Court was that the students were free
to start additional clubs. Id. Again, this factor appeared to mitigate against a finding that
the school appeared to endorse religion or a particular religious belief.
88. 113 S. Ct. 2141 (1993).
89. Id. at 2143-44.
90. Id. at 2144-45.
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regulations provided that school facilities could be used for social, civic,
and recreational purposes, as well as by public organizations."
However, the regulations specifically denied use by any group for
religious purposes.'
The Court determined that excluding religious speech in this
situation was not reasonable or viewpoint neutral. 3 The Court found
that the school district policy discriminated on the basis of viewpoint by
allowing all viewpoints about family issues and children except those
from a religious perspective." The Court believed that a lecture or film
about childrearing and family values was a social or civic use permitted
by school district regulations.9' The Court then concluded that the
district denied the Church's request based solely on the film's religious
perspective.96
In a terse analysis, the Court applied the Lemon test and rejected the
district's Establishment Clause defense. In this case, a broad range of
private organizations used the school facilities, the religious film would
be shown after school hours, and the meeting would be open to both
church members and the public.98 Therefore, the Court saw no danger
that the community would perceive that the school endorsed religion or
a particular creed.
Widmar, Mergens, and Lamb's Chapel have established that public
universities and high schools must allow religious groups to use school
facilities if the school generally allows open access to other groups. Yet
91. Id. at 2143-44.
92. Id. at 2144. Despite the district's stated policy of excluding religious groups, a
few arguably religious groups, including the Salvation Army Youth Band, a New Age
religious group, the Southern Harmonize Gospel Singers, and the Hampton Council of
Churches' Billy Taylor Concert, had already used school facilities. Id. at 2146 n.5.
Although it did not rule on the issue, the Court questioned whether the school district had
in fact opened the property for religious uses. Id. at 2146-47.
93. Id. at 2145. The Court assumed, without deciding, that the courts below correctly
found that religious uses were excluded from the limited public forum created by the
school district. Id. at 2147.
94. Id. at 2147.
95. Id.
96. Id.
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these opinions also suggest that in certain circumstances public schools
may restrict students' free speech rights to worship and discuss religious
issues on school property." The Eighth Circuit recently addressed
whether Free Speech Clause concerns required the inclusion of religious
groups when a junior high school"rc granted limited access to two
nonreligious groups."° '
III. GOOD NEWS AND THE EXCLUSION OF STUDENT RELIGIOUS
AcTrVmES AFTER SCHOOL
In Good News/Good Sports Club v. School District of Ladue,'° 2
the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals struck down the Ladue School
District's use-of-premises policy because it discriminated against a
Christian club's religious viewpoint. 3 The policy prohibited the use
of school district facilities from three p.m. to six p.m. on school days by
all community groups except for athletic groups and Scouts.'
Further, the policy specified that the Scouts' meetings could not contain
religious speech or activities."0
The Good News/Good Sports Club was a nondenominational
community group composed of students and parents in the school
99. For a discussion of the circumstances when public schools may restrict students'
free speech rights to worship and discuss religious issues on school property, see supra
part II.B.
100. For a discussion of the Establishment Clause consequences of allowing religious
groups in elementary or junior high schools, see supra notes 78-99 and accompanying text.
101. See infra part III for a discussion of the Eighth Circuit case.
102. 28 F.3d 1501 (8th Cir. 1994).
103. Id. at 1503.
104. Id. The school district policy provided:
Permission for use of school facilities after instructional time ends on school days
will be granted to Community Groups: (1) for use of District's athletic facilities,
provided that the use is limited exclusively to athletic activities; and (2) for meetings
of Scouts (Girl, Boy, Cub, Tiger Cub, and Brownies), provided that such meetings
shall be limited exclusively to the scout program and shall not include any speech or
activity involving religion or religious beliefs.
Id.
105. Id. The district court had held that the Good News/Good Sports Club lacked
standing to assert the alleged First Amendment violation of the Scouts' rights to freedom
of speech. Good News/Good Sports Club v. School Dist. of Ladue, 859 F. Supp. 1239,
1248 (E.D. Mo. 1993).
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district."°6 The club's purpose was to teach Christian religious beliefs
and moral values to junior high school students."' Club meetings
included prayers, Bible readings, and Christian songs.108  After
receiving complaints about proselytizing by the club,"' the Ladue
School District terminated its use-of-premises policy allowing equal
access to all groups and instituted the policy limiting use to the Scouts
and athletic groups.' Subsequently, the school district denied the
Good News/Good Sports Club's request to continue meeting at the junior
high school immediately after school.'
Parents and students who participated in the club sued the school
district, charging that the school district violated their First Amendment
right to practice religion. 12 They argued that the Ladue use-of-
premises policy constituted impermissible viewpoint discrimination
because the policy was not neutral in purpose or effect toward
religion." 3 The district court rejected this argument, holding that the
Ladue School District's policy excluding religious groups was
permissible because the school was a nonpublic forum. 4 In addition,
the court found that the school district had expressed a valid fear of
violating the Establishment Clause if the Good News/Good Sports Club




109. In February of 1992, two parents complained to the school board about the Good
News/Good Sports Club's recruitment of their children to attend meetings. Good
News/Good Sports Club, 859 F. Supp. at 1242.
110. The district amended its policy after receiving its attorney's opinion that the
policy in effect might violate the Establishment Clause. Id.
111. Id. A former school board member founded the club in the late 1970s, and the
club traditionally met once a month after school at a private home. Id. at 1241-42. The
Good News Club met at Ladue Junior High School from December of 1988 through spring
of 1992. Id. The prior policy permitted any community or student group whose
application was approved to use school district facilities if space was available. Id.
112. Id. at 1241.
113. Good News/Good Sports Club, 859 F. Supp. at 1241.
114. Id. at 1244. The district court found that the school facilities were a nonpublic
forum from three p.m. to six p.m. because the facilities were not open to indiscriminate
use by the public. Id. In the court's view, the selective access granted to the Scouts, who
had a longstanding relationship with the school, and to community members wishing to
use the athletic facilities did not convert the nonpublic forum into a limited public forum.
Id.
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were permitted to use school facilities." 5
The Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals reversed."' First, the court
found that the use-of-premises policy discriminated on the basis of
viewpoint.117 The court defined the purpose of both the Good
News/Good Sports club and the Boy Scouts as "moral and character
development.' '. The court then found that the use policy allowed the
Scouts to express their viewpoints on moral and character development
but prohibited the Club's religious viewpoint on this same subject." 9
The Eighth Circuit also rejected the school district's Establishment
Clause defense. 2° The school district argued that it had terminated the
equal access policy and instituted its current policy because it feared an
Establishment Clause violation.' The court held that the adoption of
115. Id. at 1245.
116. Good News/Good Sports Club v. School Dist. of Ladue, 28 F.3d 1501 (8th Cir.
1994).
117. Id. at 1507. The court's finding of viewpoint discrimination seems questionable
in light of the district court's finding that the school district had not desired to censor the
Club's point of view.
118. Id. at 1506. The Eighth Circuit defined the activities of the Boy Scouts too
broadly. Consequently, it unnecessarily found an overlap between the activities of the
Good News Club and the Boy Scouts.
119. Id. at 1506-07. The Court essentially found that the Boy Scouts, itself a Christian
organization, presented a secular view on moral development. This peculiar result was due
in part to the procedural history of the case. The plaintiffs below argued that the Boy
Scouts were religious, while the defendants argued that they were primarily a secular
organization. Moreover, the policy excluded religious discussion by the Scouts.
120. Id. at 1507-10; see supra part II.C (discussing the Establishment Clause defense).
121. 28 F.3d at 1507-10. The Ladue School District's argument that it was justifiably
concerned about an Establishment Clause violation in changing its use-of-premises policy
was apparently a secondary argument, located in Section VI of its brief. Appellee's Brief
at 41, Good News/Good Sports Club v. School District of Ladue, 28 F.3d 1501 (8th Cir.
1994) (No. 93-2148 EM). The district's primary argument was that the school district
could terminate the limited public forum created by the equal access policy at any time for
any reason. Id. at 17.
Both the dissent and the district court found that the school district had lawfully
terminated the limited public forum and created a nonpublic forum with the new policy.
28 F.3d at 1512-13 (Bright J., dissenting); Good News/Good Sports Club v. School Dist.
of Ladue, 859 F. Supp. 1239, 1249-50 (E.D. Mo. 1993). This rendered the Establishment
Clause discussion unnecessary except to determine whether the restrictions on access were
facially reasonable and whether they concealed a bias against the viewpoint of the
excluded speakers. 28 F.3d at 1513-14 (Bright, 3., dissenting) (citing Cornelius v. NAACP
Legal Defense & Educ. Fund, Inc., 473 U.S. 788, 797, 812 (1985)).
In contrast the Eighth Circuit majority believed it unnecessary to evaluate whether the
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the amended use policy was unwarranted under the Establishment Clause
because the equal access policy satisfied the Lemon test." The court
found that the equal access policy had the secular purpose of ensuring a
free exchange of ideas." Similarly, the court reasoned that the equal
access policy avoided excessive school district involvement because
schools would not be required to distinguish between groups using its
facilities. 4
Finally, the court concluded that the equal access policy did not
have the primary effect of advancing religion."z First, the court found
that the number of nonreligious uses of the school district forum eclipsed
the number of religious uses." Second, the court reasoned that junior
high school students were mature enough to understand that the school
was not endorsing religion by allowing the club to meet.12 7 Third, the
court saw no danger in allowing the club to meet immediately after
instructional hours."2 Fourth, the court noted that the involvement of
a former school board member in the Good News/Good Sports Club did
not improperly associate the school district with the club.29
IV. GOOD NEW' IMPACT ON PUBLIC SCHOOL's ABILITY
TO REMAIN RELIGION-FREE
In Good News, the Eighth Circuit extended the principles of Lamb's
school facilities were a nonpublic forum between three and six p.m. on school days. 28
F.3d at 1503 n.3. Instead, the court adhered strictly to the structure of the Supreme
Court's analysis in Lamb's Chapel, despite the factual differences in the cases. For farther
discussion, see infra notes 131-35 and accompanying text.
122. 28 F.3d at 1508-10. However, the Eighth Circuit ignored various factors that
support an inference of state endorsement of religion. See infra note 138 and
accompanying notes.
123. 28 F.3d at 1508.
124. Id. at 1510.
125. Id.
126. Good News/Good Sports Club, 28 F.3d at 1509. The court noted that the Good
News Club used the forum eight times while the Boy Scouts and athletic teams used the
forum 993 times. Id.
127. Id. at 1509.
128. Id. at 1509-10.
129. Id. at 1510. The court distinguished the involvement of a school board member
from that of a teacher, finding that students might wish to emulate the latter but not the
former. Id.
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Chapel by holding that the Ladue School District must allow a parent-led
Christian club composed of sixth, seventh, and eighth grade students to
meet after school even when the forum was open to only two other
nonreligious student groups.131 In so doing, the court restricted a
public school's ability to remain religion-neutral immediately after school
hours.
In Good News, the Eighth Circuit essentially held that Lamb's
Chapel precludes a school district from changing its equal access
policy.' This is plainly wrong. Lamb's Chapel dealt only with a
denial of use contrary to the terms of an existing use-of-premises
policy.13 Unlike the school district in Lamb's Chapel, the Ladue
School District terminated an equal access policy that provided a limited
public forum and instituted a policy that created a nonpublic forum from
three to six p.m.' The Supreme Court has repeatedly held that a
government entity may close a limited public forum at any time.'34
Moreover, restrictions on a nonpublic forum must be only facially
reasonable and not conceal a bias against the excluded speakers.'35
The Eighth Circuit's analysis in Good News is troubling in other
130. Good News involved a junior high school's policy excluding all religious uses of
school property from three to six p.m. while allowing two types of student groups - the
Boy Scouts and athletic groups - to use the facilities during that time. 28 F.3d at 1503.
In contrast, the Supreme Court in Lamb's Chapel struck down a senior high school's
exclusion of all religious groups based on a regulation allowing a broad range of
community groups to use the facilities after school hours. Lamb's Chapel v. Center
Moriches Union Free School Dist., 113 S. Ct. 2141 (1993).
131. The dissenting judge in Good News recognized the majority incorrectly applied
Lamb's Chapel as the controlling Supreme Court precedent. 28 F.3d at 1511. The more
closely analogous cases are Perry Educ. Ass' v. Perry Local Educators' Ass'n, 460 U.S.
37 (1983) and Cornelius v. NAACP Legal Defense and Educ. Fund, Inc., 473 U.S. 788
(1985), both of which involved nonpublic forums.
132. In Lamb's Chapel, the Court found that the school district denied access to all
religious groups contrary to its policy allowing any use for social, civic, or recreational
purposes. 113 S. CL at 2143-44.
133. See supra note 121. The majority did not rule on the character of the property
as a limited public or nonpublic forum. However, both the dissent and the district court
found that the prior use-of-premises policy had created a limited public forum and the
amended use policy created a nonpublic forum. Good News/Good Sports Club, 28 F.3d
at 1512-13 (Bright, J., dissenting); Good News/Good Sports Club v. School Dist. of Ladue,
859 F. Supp. 1239, 1249-50 (E.D. Mo. 1993).
134. See supra note 39 and accompanying text.
135. See Comelius v. NAACP Legal Defense & Educ. Fund, Inc., 473 U.S. 788, 797,
812 (1985).
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ways. First, in its viewpoint discrimination analysis, the court
expansively defined the subject matter included in the forum. 3 In the
case of a nonpublic forum, the usual inquiry is only whether the
exclusion is facially reasonable. 137  Second, in determining that an
equal-access policy did not violate the Establishment Clause, the court
overlooked or summarily dismissed a number of factors that increased
the likelihood that the community would perceive Ladue Junior High
School as encouraging Christian student activities.
13 1
Other courts should avoid following the Eighth Circuit's lead. In
determining whether a school has discriminated on the basis of
viewpoint, courts should carefully define the categories of speech
designated by school officials as appropriate for school facilities.'39
When school officials attempt to keep a nonpublic forum religion-neutral,
the proper question is whether the school has attempted to suppress one
religious point of view and to encourage another." Furthermore,
136. The majority opinion concluded that the Boy Scouts' speech at Ladue Junior
High School involved "moral character and youth development" based on the "ideals of
scouting" set out in a national scouting manual. 28 F.3d at 1505-06. The court did not
cite any testimony regarding the activities of Scouts at their meetings at the junior high
school. Moreover, the junior high school's use-of-premises policy limited the Scout's
activities as a condition of using the forum. Id. at 1506.
137. For a discussion of this more deferential standard of review see supra notes 31-49
and accompanying text.
138. A variety of factors supported an inference that the school endorsed the Christian
values of the club. A former school board member had initiated and led the Good News
Club meetings. Good News/Good Sports Club v. School Dist. of Ladue, 859 F. Supp
1239, 1241-42 (E.D. Mo. 1993). The sixth, seventh, and eighth grade students at the
junior high school were younger and more impressionable than high school students and
less able to differentiate state accommodation and state endorsement of religion. Students
were likely to infer that the school encouraged participation because the club held meetings
immediately after school hours and before the late buses returned students to their homes.
The inference of state endorsement was also strong because only two other groups used
school facilities at the time the club met.
139. Some commentators question whether public forum analysis is appropriate in the
public school context because schools necessarily engage in viewpoint discrimination in
selecting curricula. See Salomone, supra note 24; Black, supra note 36.
140. In Perry Education Ass'n, the Court examined whether a public school had
engaged in viewpoint discrimination by excluding all but a single union from using school
mailbox and delivery systems. 460 U.S. 37, 48 (1983). The Court held that the school
had based its policy on the status, not the views, of the unions because the chosen union
was the exclusive bargaining representative for the teachers. Id. The Court emphasized
the inherent need to limit activities in a nonpublic forum to those compatible with the
forum's purpose. Id.
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courts should heed the Supreme Court's admonition that courts must be
"particularly vigilant in monitoring the Establishment Clause in
elementary and secondary schools." 41
Under the Eighth Circuit's analysis, it is more difficult for school
districts to disassociate from religious disputes among students and
parents. To avoid these problems, a school might attempt to restrict
after-school use of facilities to one or more carefully selected groups. 142
However, Good News leaves open only a single avenue for limiting
access to religious groups while avoiding a First Amendment violation:
close the school to all groups, either completely or for a limited time
after school hours.
V. CONCLUSION
In Good News, the Eighth Circuit struck down a junior high
school's attempt to allow two nonreligious student groups to use school
facilities while keeping the forum religion-neutral. In so doing, the Good
News court went too far in limiting public schools' ability to keep
religious instruction a private concern. In light of the highly personal
nature of religious beliefs, the divisiveness of religious issues, and the
public school system's role in shaping impressionable young minds, the
ability of elementary and junior high schools to remain neutral to religion
must be preserved.
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141. Edwards v. Aguillard, 482 U.S. 578, 584-84 (1987).
142. However, as the Ladue School District learned, a court may disfavor such a
policy even when the school acts with the best of intentions. See supra note 131 and
accompanying text.
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